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Abstract We studied the emotional processes that allow peo-
ple to balance two competing desires: benefitting from dishon-
esty and keeping a positive self-image. We recorded physio-
logical arousal (skin conductance and heart rate) during a
computer card game in which participants could cheat and fail
to report a certain card when presented on the screen to avoid
losing their money. We found that higher skin conductance
corresponded to lower cheating rates. Importantly, emotional
intelligence regulated this effect; participants with high emo-
tional intelligence were less affected by their physiological
reactions than those with low emotional intelligence. As a
result, they were more likely to profit from dishonesty.
However, no interaction emerged between heart rate and emo-
tional intelligence. We suggest that the ability to manage and
control emotions can allow people to overcome the tension
between doing right or wrong and license them to bend the
rules.
Keywords Skin conductance . Unethical behavior .
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People encounter ethical dilemmas almost every day. They
can receive extra change at the grocery store, or they are
tempted to steal office supplies at work. In these situations,
they face two opposite desires: serving their self-interest, and
maintaining a positive self-concept. Accordingly, they cheat
to the extent to which they can balance these opposite moti-
vations (Ayal & Gino, 2011; Barkan, Ayal, Gino, & Ariely,
2012; Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008).
Recent work examined the cognitive and contextual factors
that enable people to reduce this tension and bend ethical
rules, such as self-serving justifications and ambiguous rules
of conduct (Ayal, Gino, Barkan, & Ariely, 2015; Pittarello,
Leib, Gordon-Hecker, & Shalvi, 2015; Schweitzer & Hsee,
2002; Shalvi, Dana, Handgraaf, & De Dreu, 2011; Shalvi,
Gino, Barkan, & Ayal, 2015). However, the emotional mech-
anisms underlying tension reduction have been largely
ignored.
We aim to fill this gap and propose that the way people
manage and control emotions (i.e., emotional intelligence)
will allow them to overcome the discomfort that arises from
the desire to do wrong while at the same time maintaining a
positive self-image. Specifically, we suggest that people who
can successfully manage and control their emotions will be
less affected by the arousal elicited by ethical dilemmas (Gu,
Zhong, & Page-Gould, 2013; Wilkinson, 1987) than those
who are less capable to do so. As a result, they will be more
likely to serve their self-interest dishonestly.
Physiological costs of lying
Moral concerns can be a source of distress, because they con-
front people with desires that are inconsistent with their moral
principles (Allport, 1955; Hochman, Glöckner, Fiedler, &
Ayal, 2015; Rosenberg, 1979; Wilkinson, 1987). These con-
cerns trigger a stress reaction linked to the autonomic nervous
system (ANS) response. This reaction can be registered in the
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form of physiological arousal in different somatic systems.
Two well-established measures of arousal are the simulta-
neous registration of changes in heart rate and electrodermal
activity.
In normal adults, heart rate (HR) depends on the pacemaker
activity of the sinoatrial node cells and constantly varies in
response to a number of factors, including cognitive effort
and emotional stimulation (Kreibig & Gendolla, 2014). The
sinoatrial node cells are innervated by the sympathetic ner-
vous efferents and by the parasympathetic fibers of the vagus
nerve, which exert a speeding-up and a slowing-down influ-
ence on the heart, respectively. Increased sympathetic activity,
which occurs during a challenge or a psychological stress
(Brosschot & Thayer, 2003), correlates with acceleration in
heart rate. Such acceleration reflects higher arousal
(Appelhans & Luecken, 2006).
Likewise, changes in electrodermal activity in response to a
stressor represent a reliable index of sympathetic activation
(Boucsein, 1992; Kreibig & Gendolla, 2014). Skin conduc-
tance level (SCL) is an electrodermal measure caused by the
activity of sweat glands that are innervated solely by the sym-
pathetic branch of the autonomic nervous system (SNS).
Because SNS activity is predominant when responding to
emotional challenging stimuli, changes in SCL are a particu-
larly useful indicator of emotional arousal (Boucsein, 1992).
Hence, both somatic systems respond to stress with a sub-
stantial increase in their activity and share some common rep-
resentation in the brain. Despite these similarities, the brain
patterns that predict these two autonomic responses are largely
distinct (Eisenbarth, Chang, & Wager, 2016). These observed
differences could reflect different involvement of parasympa-
thetic and sympathetic responses (Berntson et al., 1997).
Whereas an increase in SCL is related exclusively to a sym-
pathetic response, HR also is subjected to a more rapid para-
sympathetic contribution (Berntson et al., 1994; Eisenbarth,
et al. 2016). For these reasons, it is important to measure
multiple types of autonomic activity to clarify the role of dif-
ferent systems and how they play out when it comes to stress-
ful decisions.
Recent work suggests that stress and arousal are
Binstrumental in driving ethical behavior^ (Teper, Zhong, &
Inzlicht, 2015, p. 2). Accordingly, Teper and colleagues
(2011) found that participants’ levels of arousal corresponded
to lower rates of unethical behavior, and Gu and colleagues
(2013) showed that participants who listened to faster (vs.
slower) heart beats were less likely to act dishonestly. The idea
behind these findings is based on the stress and coping theory
(Lazarus & Folkman, 1984), which suggests that, in stressful
situations, people attempt to remove the source of stress or
regulate stressful emotions via coping strategies.When it comes
to ethical dilemmas, resolving such stress can either lead people
to do the right thing or lie (Gu et al., 2013). Finally, Dienstbier
and Hunter (1971) found that people cheated more when they
could attribute stress symptoms to external causes. If arousal
curbs dishonesty, it is reasonable to expect its effect to be weak-
er among people who are generally less impacted by it, such as
those who can successfully cope with aversive states and are
more capable to manage their emotions.
Emotional intelligence and coping strategies
Although everybody experiences emotions, people differ in
the extent to which they identify, manage, and control them.
One construct widely used to account for these differences is
trait emotional intelligence (henceforth: trait EI). According to
Petrides, Pita, and Kokkinaki (2007), trait EI represents a set
of emotional perceptions located at the lowest level of the
personality hierarchies. This definition of trait EI recognizes
the subjective nature of human emotional experience and is
concerned with people’s perceptions and management of their
own and others’ emotions.
It has been shown that people differ in how they process,
use, and manage affective information both of interpersonal
and intrapersonal nature (Petrides & Furnham, 2003). For in-
stance, people with high trait EI are better at coping with
stressful situations and use more adequate emotion regulation
strategies than people with low trait EI (Mikolajczak, Nelis,
Hansenne, & Quoidbach, 2008; Petrides, Sangareau,
Furnham, & Frederickson, 2006). Additionally, trait EI is re-
lated to different physiological measures. For example, indi-
viduals with high (vs. low) trait EI exhibited larger pupil dila-
tion when looking at charts reporting the performance of stock
funds (and were more likely to invest even when the fund had
recently lost value; Rubaltelli, Agnoli, & Franchin, 2016).
Furthermore, individuals with high (vs. low) trait EI tend to
have lower levels of low frequency/high frequency heart rate
ratio (an index of stress; Laborde, Brüll, Weber, & Anders,
2011) and lower cortisol response (Mikolajczak, Roy,
Luminet, Fillée, & de Timary, 2007).
Based on these findings, we tested the hypothesis that
greater physiological activation induced by ethical dilemmas
would decrease dishonesty. However, this effect should be
moderated by trait EI, in a way that individuals with high
(vs. low) trait EI should be less impacted by their physiolog-
ical reactions when facing ethical situations. This would allow
them to distance themselves from their bodily reactions
(Damasio, 1994) and license them to cheat.
Method
Participants
Sixty-seven university students (73% female, Mage = 22.37,
SDage = 4.98) were recruited via advertisements on campus
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and participated in an experimental session of ~20 minutes.
The experiment was performed in individual sessions, and
participants were left alone in the room during the task to
reduce feelings of being monitored.
Stimuli, apparatus, and procedure
Upon arrival to the laboratory, participants read and signed a
consent form indicating that they would be partaking in a
decision-making task and that their physiological measures
would be recorded during the session. HR and SCL were
measured in a standardized fashion using a multimodality,
physiological monitoring device that encodes biological sig-
nals in real-time (ProComp Infiniti, Thought Technology;
Montrea l , Canada) . To obtain HR, we recorded
photoplethysmography—a simple and noninvasive technique
u s e d t o d e t e c t b l o o d v o l um e p u l s e ( BVP ) .
Photopletysmograph sensor was attached to the thumb finger-
tip of the participant’s nondominant hand, and BVP signal
was processed via a 12-bit analog-to-digital converter with a
sampling rate of 256 times per second and stored sequentially
for analysis. HR data recorded during each phase were com-
puted and artifacts were controlled for (see Supplementary
Analyses for additional details).
SCL was recorded using two Ag/Ag-Cl gel-less electrodes
attached to the medial phalange of the second and fourth fin-
gers of the participant’s nondominant hand. Sampling for elec-
trodermal activity (EDA) was set at 256 Hz. Skin conductance
in micro-Siemens (μS) was collected at a sampling rate of 32
times per second. Separate mean HR and SCL scores were
calculated for the 5-minute baseline period and the entire du-
ration of the decision-making task.
Participants received an initial endowment of 60€ (~$65)
and learned that at the end of the task two participants would
be selected at random and win an amount of money (up to 60
€) based on their decisions in the task. The task included 120
trials, preceded by a practice phase. In each trial, a black fix-
ation cross appeared in the center of the screen for 2,000 ms,
followed by two cards: one on the right side and the other on
the left side of the screen. To limit the effect of time constraint
(Shalvi, Eldar, & Bereby-Meyer, 2012), the cards were pre-
sented for an unlimited amount of time. In the 60 experimental
trials, one of the two cards was a number (1-10), whereas the
other was a BJ^ (Joker). In the 60 remaining filler trials, both
cards were numbers. Participants were instructed to press the
Bm^ button on the keyboard every time one of the two cards
was a BJ^ and the Bb^ button every time both cards were
numbers. Participants further learned that they would lose 1€
whenever they pressed the Bm^ button and that they would
lose no money whenever they pressed the Bb^ button. After
clicking either Bm^ or Bb,^ participants saw their current pay-
off amount (for a similar procedure see Motro, Ordóñez,
Pittarello, & Welsh, 2016; Pittarello, Motro, Rubaltelli, &
Pluchino, 2016). This setting presented an ethical dilemma:
participants could be honest, report correctly that a Joker ap-
peared on the screen, but lose 1€. Alternatively, they could
cheat and fail to report a Joker when it was actually presented
and lose no money (Fig. 1). For robustness purposes, the lo-
cation of the Joker was counterbalanced within the trials.
Including filler trials allowed us to rule out the possibility that
cheating resulted from simple mistakes or inattention.
Because there were 60 experimental trials, an honest par-
ticipant would end the task with 0€ (60€ - 1€ × 60 Jokers).
Conversely, participants wishing to maximize their earnings
could lie and fail to report a Joker when this appeared on the
screen. At the end of the task, participants completed the Trait
Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire Short Form (Petrides,
2009). This 30-item scale asked participants to self-report
the tendency to regulate, express, and perceive their emotions.
Adequate internal consistencies and broad coverage of the
sampling domain of the construct have been reported
(Petrides et al., 2007). Answers were provided on a 7-point
scale that ranged from 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (complete-
ly agree). The measure showed a good reliability (α = 0.88).
Upon completion of the study, participants were thanked and
debriefed.
Results
Cheating behavior We measured how many times partici-
pants failed to report the Joker card across the 60 experimental
trials (4,020 observations). Results showed that participants
cheated in 17.30% of the trials. To ensure that cheating
reflected participants’ motivation to serve their self-interest
rather than simple mistakes or inattention, we analyzed how
many times they incorrectly reported a BJoker^ card (and sub-
sequently lost money) in the filler trials, where no Joker was
displayed (i.e., Bself-hurting^ mistakes). In line with previous
work (Motro et al., 2016; Pittarello, et al., 2016), participants
were accurate in 99.3% of the filler trials, showing that errors
in reporting a card are associated with the presence of a Joker;
therefore, they represent actual cheating behavior.
HR, trait EI, and cheating behavior Two participants were
excluded from the analyses due to technical difficulties in
recording the HR during the task, and five participants did
not complete the trait EI questionnaire. This left us with 60
participants (3,600 observations).
We conducted a repeated-measure logistic regression using
R and the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2015), predicting par-
ticipants’ likelihood to cheat as a function of baseline HR,
gender (given our unbalanced sample), trial order (to account
for the effect of time), reaction times (because previous work
found that they are associated with different arousal levels, see
Bradley, Greenwald, Petry, & Lang, 1992), participants’ HR
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during the task, trait EI (centered), and the interaction between
HR during the task and trait EI. We further included the ran-
dom effects of subjects, trial order, and their interaction.
Results showed a significant effect of gender, χ2 (1) =
68.44, b = −36.44, SE = 4.40, p < 0.0001, 95% confidence
interval [CI] (−45.075, −27.808), showing that men were less
likely to cheat than women. None of the other effects was
significant, χ2 (1) < 1, ps > 0.56.
SCL, trait EI, and cheating behavior Five participants who
did not complete the trait EI questionnaire were removed from
the analyses, leaving a sample of 62 participants (3,720 obser-
vations).We conducted a repeated-measure logistic regression
predicting cheating behavior as a function of baseline SCL,
gender, trial order, reaction times, SCL during the task, trait EI
(centered), and the interaction between SCL during the task
and trait EI. The random effects were subjects, trial order, and
their interaction. The effect of gender was significant, χ2 (1) =
17.39, b = −0.45, SE = 0.11, p < 0.0001, 95% CI (−0.663,
−0.239), which showed that men cheated less than women.
The effect of trial order was significant, χ2 (1) = 6.99, b =
0.003, SE = 0.001, p = 0.008, 95% CI [0.001, 0.006], and
indicated that cheating increased over time. The effect of
SCL during the task also was significant, χ2 (1) = 9.86, b =
−0.99, SE = 0.314, p = 0.002, 95% CI (−1.600, −0.370), and
showed that greater SCL during the task corresponded to a
lower likelihood to cheat. Finally, the interaction between
SCL during the task and trait EI was significant, χ2 (1) =
8.87, b = 0.85, SE = 0.28, p = 0.003, 95% CI (0.289, 1.401),
and indicated that as SCL during the task increased, the like-
lihood to cheat increased for higher trait EI (Fig. 2).
Discussion
In ethical situations, the ability to manage emotions allows
people to reduce the tension between the desire to do right
and the motivation to serve their self-interest. Using the
Joker task (Motro et al., 2016; Pittarello et al., 2016), we asked
participants to report whether one of two cards presented on
the screen was a Joker or not. Because reporting a Joker meant
losing money, participants could cheat and fail to report it. We
recorded HR and SCL—two measures of emotional arousal
(Appelhans & Luecken, 2006; Boucsein, 1992)—and found
that higher SCL corresponded to a lower likelihood to cheat.
Importantly, this association was moderated by emotional in-
telligence: as SCL increased, participants with high emotional
intelligence were more likely to cheat than those with low
emotional intelligence. The finding suggests that high emo-
tional intelligence allows people to distance themselves from
their bodily reactions (Damasio, 1994; Slovic, Finucane,
Peters, & MacGregor, 2007) and licenses them to do wrong.
When experiencing the increase in emotional arousal, caused
by a task that places the individual under stress and hence
activates a defensive response, participants with low emotion-
al intelligence were less capable of managing their emotions
and preferred to reduce their cheating behavior to cope with
the situation and restore homeostasis.
However, we did not find the same pattern when looking at
heart rate. One possible explanation is that arousal is more
closely associated with increases in skin conductance level
than cardiac acceleration (Barry & Sokolov, 1993), which is
a more complex measure that depends on the SNS, but it also
is regulated, in part, by the PNS (Cacioppo & Tassinary,
1990).
While the involvement of both autonomic branches may
cause a lower perception of emotional arousal, the activation
of the single SNS, an index of SCL, induces a more intense
perception of aroused bodily responses. This idea is related to
the somatic marker hypothesis (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio,
& Anderson, 1994), which highlights the importance of sig-
nals from the body when decisions are taken to obtain a pun-
ishment or a reward. These somatic markers have been linked
to the activity of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC;
Wright, & Rakow, 2017)—the most predictive brain pattern
involved in SCL (Eisenbarth et al., 2016). Accordingly,
Fig. 1 Schematic representation of the experimental procedure
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people with high trait EI have been found to havemore intense
somatic activation that, as a result, induce them to regulate
their emotions more effectively (Rubaltelli et al., 2016).
As mentioned earlier, the literature shows a high amount of
unshared variance across HR and SCL (e.g., 86%; see Croft
et al., 2004), which can be explained by largely distinct brain
patterns activated by these two autonomic responses
(Eisenbarth et al., 2016). SCL is linked to VMPFC, whereas
HR is mostly related to the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex,
which does not seem to play a key role in linking somatic
responses with EI.
We believe that our results provide novel contributions to
the field of behavioral ethics and emotional intelligence. Our
work fits the call for a better understanding of how emotions
and emotional processes affect dishonesty (Treviño, den
Nieuwenboer, & Kish-Gephart, 2014). Additionally, we build
on emotional intelligence literature to further our knowledge
of what leads people to solve the tension that arises when the
self-interest is pitted against honesty. We also extend the cur-
rent literature on emotional intelligence. Conventional
wisdom considers emotional intelligence as a positive trait,
because it is generally associated with happiness, well-being,
effective interpersonal relationships, and successful job per-
formance (Cote & Miners, 2006; Furnham & Petrides, 2003).
On the other hand, the downsides of emotional intelligence, so
far, received little attention (for an exception see Austin,
Farrelly, Black, & Moore, 2007). We cautiously suggest that
emotional intelligence can backfire when people have the op-
portunity to profit from dishonesty, allowing people to ratio-
nalize on their misbehavior and frame it in a more acceptable
way (Tenbrunsel &Messick, 2004).While we believe that this
is an interesting perspective with real-world implications, ad-
ditional research is needed to strengthen this claim.
From a theoretical point of view, it would be worth manip-
ulating emotion management strategies to test causality and to
gain insights on whether individuals can learn to downplay
their emotional reactions in ethical situations. One way to do
so would be to instruct participants to distance themselves
from their emotional reactions and ask them to think in a very
analytical and objective manner before giving them the possi-
bility to cheat.
Because we assessed the average levels of heart rate and
skin conductance during a series of ethical decisions, we can-
not infer causal relationship between arousal and dishonesty.
In line with Hochman and colleagues (2015), we suggest that
arousal reflects the tension between doing right or wrong. It
should be noted that previous work by Coricelli, Joffily,
Montmarquette, & Villeval (2010) maintained that higher
arousal corresponds to greater cheating. However, Coricelli
and colleagues’ clever design assessed tax evasion behav-
ior—a situation in which participants potentially could be
punished, and whose identity as evaders could be made pub-
lic. Future work is needed to clarify the association among
emotions, arousal, and cheating. One way to do this would
be to devise one-shot experiments in which arousal is mea-
sured before and after the decision to cheat, and emotional
intelligence is assessed. This setting also would shed light
on whether emotional intelligence acts as a pre- or post-
violation strategy to cope with arousal.
In our task, participants could cheat to avoid losing money.
In these situations, people are generally more likely to behave
unethically compared with when the cheating would allow
them to earn an equal-sized gain (Cameron & Miller, 2009;
Kern & Chug, 2009; Grolleau, Kocher, & Sutan, 2016;
Schindler & Pfattheicher, 2017; Shalvi, 2012). It would be
interesting for future research to examine whether the
Fig. 2 Interaction between trait EI and SCL. Trait EI was median split for ease of representation
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buffering effect of emotional intelligence on arousal is ampli-
fied when people can bend ethical rules to increase (vs. avoid
losing) their monetary endowment. Relatedly, a promising
line of work would be to manipulate the ambiguity of a moral
situation and measure individual differences in morality traits.
A reasonable prediction would be that emotion regulation
strategies would license people to cheat only when the
cheating is hard versus easy to justify and would have little
effect among participants with higher moral disengagement or
psychopathy traits, who generally tend to suffer emotional
deficits.
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Conclusions
Unethical behavior poses great threats to individuals and so-
cieties at large. It is therefore crucial to understand what leads
people to act dishonestly. We suggest that emotional intelli-
gence can license people to do wrong by reducing the tension
that arises from acting upon their moral beliefs and serving
their self-interest. Our results have important applied implica-
tions. For instance, managers should be aware of potential side
effects of emotional intelligence when assigning ethical tasks
to their employees. By doing so, they would be able to curb
malpractices and promote a more ethical climate.
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